segunda-feira, setembro 28, 2009

Conseguirá a Rússia conservar o seu Extremo Oriente?

Nos tempos, quando os politólogos russos adoram dividir virtualmente a Ucrânia, o investigador ucraniano, Vitaly Kulik, o Director do Centro de Pesquisa dos Problemas da Sociedade Civil, apresentou na capital ucraniana o seu recente estudo, intitulado: “Conseguirá a Rússia conservar o Extremo Oriente?”

Ler em russo:

Ler em inglês:

domingo, setembro 13, 2009

Ucrânia teme a agressão russa

Um grupo de 29 personalidades públicas ucranianas, incluindo o 1º Presidente da Ucrânia independente, Leonid Kravchuk, apelou aos membros permanentes do Conselho de Segurança da ONU (à excepção da Rússia, claro) e à comunidade internacional em geral para que reforcem as garantias de segurança a Kyiv, dada a postura cada vez mais agressiva da Rússia.

Num documento publicado ontem, o grupo apela, em primeira instância, aos membros do Conselho de Segurança que, nos termos do Memorando de Budapeste de 1994, garantem a independência da Ucrânia; esta é “uma medida necessária “, uma vez que a atitude russa faz com que estas garantias sejam “insuficientes”. Além disso, os autores apelam à União Europeia que “assuma uma posição clara sobre a questão da garantia da soberania ucraniana contra quaisquer formas de interferência russa nos assuntos internos do país.”

Vienna, September 11 – A group of 29 leading public figures in Ukraine, including former president Leonid Kravchuk, is calling on the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council -- other than Russia, of course -- and the international community more generally to provide enhanced security guarantees to Kyiv given Moscow’s increasingly aggressive approach.
In an appeal released yesterday, the group appeals in the first instance to the Security Council members who, under the terms of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, are guarantors of Ukraine’s independence, a step the signatories said was necessary because Russia’s attitude has made these guarantees “insufficient” (
Moreover, the authors call on the European Union to “take a clear and unambiguous position on the question of guaranteeing the state sovereignty of Ukraine and warn against any forms of interference by Russia in the internal affairs of Ukraine. And they called on the Vysegrad countries to come up with their own policies in support of Ukraine.
The appeal says that such extraordinary actions are necessary because “the Russian leadership has consciously adopted a course intended to demolish the existing system of security, a key part of which is Moscow’s ongoing effort to subordinate Ukraine to the geo-strategic interests of Russia.”
As a result, “there has been a sharp escalation of tensions in bilateral relations,” a trend that unfortunately appears to continue given “the unprecedented intensification” of the information war against Ukraine,” one in which Ukrainians are being presented in Russian society as “the enemy” and Ukraine is being portrayed as a destabilizing element in Europe.
Not only has Moscow argued that Ukraine does not have the right of a sovereign country to seek to join NATO, but it has “openly denigrated Ukrainian sovereignty” more generally and implied in various statements that it is prepared to use military force against Ukraine to achieve its ends.
“For the first time in many years,” the appeal notes, “signs have appeared that the Kremlin is not excluding the use of force” against Ukraine. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s harsh tone and the Duma’s adoption of a new law permitting Russian forces to be dispatched abroad all point in that direction.Medvedev’s “ignoring” of the content of the response of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, “the baseless accusation by Russian prosecutors that Ukrainian soldiers fought on the Georgian side in last year’s war,” and charges against Ukrainian officials in Crimea all suggest that Moscow is laying the groundwork for a possible attack. Indeed, the authors of the appeal say, “Russian rhetoric relative to Ukraine forces [them] to recall the most horrible historical examples of the 1930s,” when many countries suffered as a result of aggression first by the Nazis and then by the Soviets. But they insist that Ukraine would be the first but not the last victim of any Russian move now.
“The subordination of Ukraine by such a Russian strategy would revive the division of Europe, carry with it the most direct threats to the international and national security of the states of the European Union, and lead to a reduction of the general level of trust and security in Europe and to an escalation of tensions and conflicts in the world as a whole,” it says.
While the Ukrainian media have given this appeal extensive coverage, it has not yet attracted much attention in Europe or the United States. And in Russia, it seems certain to be dismissed – as Moscow commentators have other recent Kyiv comments (see – as part and parcel of power struggles inside Ukraine. But if the language of the appeal is emotional, the dangers it points to are all too real, and the international community will have to respond to them. If it does so soon, there is a chance that the situation can be resolved without violence, but if the community assumes it can ignore this appeal, then the dangers the appeal’s authors warn of will only grow.


quinta-feira, setembro 10, 2009

Porque a Ucrânia não é Rússia?

Ucrânia como anti – Rússia retira gradualmente os EUA do retrato maniqueísta do mundo, próprio aos moradores do Olimpo político russo.

E não apenas porque a contraposição Rússia – EUA, apesar do seu prestígio, parece ser cada vez mais cómica, para um país, que não conseguiu atingir o seu objectivo público – alcançar o Portugal.

Window on Eurasia: Ukraine is Escaping the Past but Russia is Not, Moscow Analyst Says

by: Paul Goble

Vienna, September 9 – In what matters most – a national self-definition that recognizes the futility of zero-sum politics in the modern world – Ukraine, with all its problems, nonetheless has achieved far more over the last 18 years than Russia over the same period despite or more precisely because of the bombast the latter displays continues to display
Consequently, Igor Yakovenko argued in “Yezhednevny zhurnal” last week, Ukraine has a far better chance both to develop as a modern nation and to integrate into Europe than does Russia, which despite its apparent advantages, remains mired in the imperial past and is unlikely to do either (
As the two countries mark their respective 18th birthdays, Yakovenko says, many in both of these post-Soviet lands and elsewhere focus on their commonalities, including corruption, the mixing of business and government, alcoholism and health problems, and the many other characteristics shared by most post-Soviet states.
But the differences between Russia and Ukraine are not only striking but critical for the current and future direction of the two: Ukraine has elections, while Russia does not. Ukraine has a relatively free media, while Russia does not. And Ukraine’s militia and security services are not out of control, while Russia’s in many respects very much are.
And it is because of these differences and the sense that Ukraine might achieve something Russia is unlikely to that “Ukraine as the Anti-Russia is gradually driving out the US in the Manichean picture of the world” in the Kremlin.” This is not just because talking about the US as the Anti-Russia is “comic” given Russia’s inability to “catch up to Portugal.”
Statements by Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, much covered in Russia and the West, have drawn attention to Ukraine’s problems, but they reflect Russia’s own as well. There are good reasons for “skepticism” concerning the ability of Ukraine to reach full maturity as a country, but there are even more good reasons for skepticism about Russia’s chances.
While some polls do suggest that many Ukrainians who voted for independence in 1991 would not do so again if given the chance, other polls show that “the overwhelming majority of residents of Ukraine do not want reunification with Russia” in any of the various forms some have proposed.
If reunification is not in prospect, a turn toward authoritarianism is not yet off the table in Ukraine. If Yulia Timoshenko were to become president, “her moral relativism in politics and definite demagogy,” Yakovenko says, could “destroy those extremely weak growths of European values which are barely noted in Ukraine but which give it a chance to become a normal country.
But even if Timoshenko does win, her rule would be “much less harsh than for example Putinism in Russia.” It would be “authoritarianism-lite.” And “the ‘Putin in skirts’ is someone Ukraine would not tolerate, and if it would allow it at all, Yakovenko continues, then this would not be for very long.”
“The heterogeneous quality of [Ukraine] both geographically and in terms of political clans will inevitably give birth to political and media pluralism. In Ukraine, it is impossible to create an analogue to the United Russia Party and to freeze the mass media according to the Russian model.”
All this shows, the Moscow commentator insists, that “Ukraine is already different. It, of course, is not Anti-Russia. It is Not-Russia. This is the result of its separate coming of age.” And its prospects for the future are far better, if not completely certain, than are those likely for Russia itself.
Ukraine’s “single real” chance to complete its national project is “integration into Europe.” That “goal is not near and the chances of its realization are not 100 percent, but they are far from zero.” And that is impressive if one considers the situation in the other 11 former Soviet republics and especially of the Russian Federation.
Russia remains trapped in the grip of a desire to build “a new empire,” but “the chances for the realization of this project are not simply small. They are equal to zero. They do not exist.” Russia could play a role if it was willing to accept the status of a junior partner to the US, Europe or China, but Russians are not prepared to do this.
They are not prepared to give up their “messianic goals” or to recognize that Europe has moved beyond zero-sum politics, in which there are clear winners and losers, into a system in which all participants must take away something positive. Russians remain convinced that any victory for them requires a defeat for others, and vice versa.
Moscow has “bought Schroeder, made friends with Berlusconi, purchased wholesale and retail experts and politicians in Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the United States.” But this has not brought Russia happiness, because Russia is not in a position to achieve its messianic goal of a new empire.
This then, Yakovenko argues, is “the main distinction of Russia and Ukraine.” Russia continues to think that it is an empire, to celebrate its size and power as the main things. But Ukraine is rapidly moving toward an acceptance of the reality that it is a second-tier country that must cooperate with others in a European fashion in order to survive and flourish.
On the basis of this comparison, the Moscow writer offers three conclusions. First, he says, Russia and Ukraine have “met their 18th birthdays not as adults but more as difficult youths who have not yet succeeded in dealing with their complexes. Second, the trajectories of the two countries and their peoples are ever more different.
And third – and this may prove especially hard for many Russians to accept – “people speaking one language and having a culture which is largely in common are becoming hostages of politicians who have not proved capable of rising to the extent of the tasks which the times put before them.”

quarta-feira, setembro 02, 2009

Pacto Molotov – Ribbentrop não é igual ao do Munique

Molotov-Ribbentrop and Munich Not Equivalent Then or Now, Radzikhovsky Says

Historiador russo Leonid Radzikhovsky explica porque o Pacto Molotov – Ribbentrop não pode ser equiparado ao Acordo do Munique. A diferença fundamental entre estes dois actos é a seguinte: enquanto os líderes britânicos e franceses agiram vergonhosamente para manter a paz, Stalin agiu vergonhosamente para atacar e anexar os territórios dos países vizinhos.

By: Paul Goble

New York, September 1 – Efforts by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials and commentators to justify the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Stalin’s ill-fated alliance with Hitler because of what British and French leaders had done in Munich highlight a dangerous trend in Russian thinking, according to a Moscow commentator.
Not only was the mendacity of the two actions fundamentally different – the British and French acted shamefully as part of an effort to maintain peace while Stalin acted shamefully to cover his seizure of the territory of neighboring countries, but the lessons the two have learned, Leonid Radzikhovsky says underscore the difference (
In an article in yesterday’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” the Moscow commentator says that there is now question that both Western Europe and the Soviet Union “conducted themselves in a mendacious fashion in the 1930s” in their dealings with Hitler. But “there is mendacity and mendacity,” both at the time of action and in the lessons those who engage in it ultimately learn.
It is certainly true, he writes, that “Europe handed over Czechoslovakia to Hitler.” But “European politicians did not conclude secret deals and did not seize pieces of foreign territory.” And however cynical their actions, their goal was “an idiotic hope” of keeping the peace, something those who had experienced the first world war felt was essential.
If the British and French did engage in a shameful action, Radzikhovsky notes, “Europe long ago learned its lesson.” Namely, the continent learned that “a law-based policy is MORE PROFITABLE than one based on force alone --more profitable in a humanitarian, social, economic, and that means in a political sense.”
Indeed, he continues, “politics in contemporary Europe is concentrated humanitarian sociology because the chief priority is not the size of GDP, not the size of production and not the level of consumption but the QUALITY OF LIFE.” In short, the Europeans, horrified by the kind of politics on offer at Munich have changed.
Some have suggested, he continues, that Europe, having rejected the drives of the past for Lebensraum and the like has entered into “the twilight” of its history. But what a twilight, Radzikhovsky says: Europe is at present “the most successful PROJECT in the History of Humanity,” except perhaps that of the United States.
Having rejected the politics that informed the Munich accords, Europe has entered not into “the end of history” but rather into “the end of CRUDE history” and has begun “ANOTHER history that Russians do not understand and thus view as ‘boring,’” although in fact it is anything but that.
But in contrast, “the USSR [at the time of Molotov-Ribbentrop and later] conducted itself much more mendaciously than Europe,” the “Yezhednevny zhurnal” commentator continues, and Russians now are being encouraged by their leaders to behave much more mendaciously than the Europeans are being encouraged by their leaders.
The explanations Russian officials offered and continue to offer about why Stalin reached an agreement with Hitler are “simply a LIE,” Radzikhovsky points out. Russia did not have to reach an agreement with the Nazi leader in order to prevent an alliance between Hitler and the West because the latter, having given guarantees to Poland showed that would not happen.
Thus, if Russians were honest with themselves, they would recognize that the USSR had “ANOTHER way out,” Radzikhovsky continues. It could “simply not have concluded agreements with anyone.” Had Stalin done that, Hitler would have had to reckon with the possibility of a two-front war, something the Nazi leader very much wanted to avoid.
And the fallback argument that Soviet and now Russian officials often employ when they suggest that Molotov-Ribbentrop bought the Soviet Union time does not withstand examination, the Moscow commentator says. Hitler would have moved West and then East at almost exactly the same time had there not been an accord with Stalin.
In any case, Radzikhovsky suggests, “the real motives of the USSR [in concluding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocols] were different.” They were “the simple, classical, ‘healthy imperialist’ motives – a secret protocol and the seizure of the territories of others.”
Moscow paid a price for all this, Radzikhovsky argues, first because of the resistance to Soviet occupation of these lands and then because it was precisely from them – the Baltic republics and Western Ukraine that “in 1989-1990 began the collapse of the USSR.” But the real tragedy, he suggests, is elsewhere and continuing.
Encouraged by their leaders, Russians still are unwilling to acknowledge that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact opened the way to war and that it was an imperialist act not only by Berlin but by Moscow. And still worse, they have been encouraged by their leaders to view the cynical politics of force that the Europeans have rejected as still the proper order of the day.
Indeed, the Moscow commentator concludes, Russians are being taught exactp7 the opposite lesson about Molotov-Ribbentrop that Europeans have clearly learned from Munich. As their leaders have insisted, Russians are told to believe that “Comrade Wolf eats everything and listens to no one” and that “such it always was and such it will always be.


terça-feira, setembro 01, 2009

Africanos atacados em Moscovo

Cerca de 60% dos negros ou africanos que vivem na capital russa, cidade de Moscovo, já foram agredidos fisicamente em ataques com motivações racistas, diz o estudo publicado pela BBC.