sexta-feira, março 26, 2010

Ucrânia: que tipo da Rússia precisamos?

Quer no decurso das eleições na Ucrânia, quer na sequência da vitória de Viktor Yanukovich, comentaristas russo têm discutido o tipo de Ucrânia que a Rússia precisa, comentários que não só implicavam que a Ucrânia precisava de mudar, mas também definiram como.

Mas, em um ensaio publicado ontem on-line, Olesya Yakhno, uma comentadora do portal ucraniano Glavred, argumenta que a questão mais importante para os ucranianos e até os russos é: “que tipo da Rússia precisa a Ucrânia?”.

Window on Eurasia: Ukraine Needs a Russia that is a Country like Any Other – and so Do the Russians, Kyiv Analyst Says

by: Paul Goble

New York, March 26 – Both in the course of the Ukrainian elections and following the victory of Viktor Yanukovich, Russian commentators have discussed what kind of a Ukraine Russia needs, commentaries that have not only implied that only Ukraine needs to change but also have defined how many analysts elsewhere see the issue.
But in an essay posted online yesterday, Olesya Yakhno, a commentator for the Ukrainian portal Glavred, argues that this is the wrong or at least not the only question. And she insists that an equally or even more important issue for Ukrainians and Russians alike is “what kind of Russia does Ukraine need?” (
Her answer is that both need Russia to become for Ukraine a country like any other rather than revisionist state which seeks to dominate or even absorb its neighbors, thus threatening not only more conflicts in the future but rendering it almost impossible for Russia itself to make the transition to a modern, free and democratic country.
Since Yanukovich’s victory, she notes, “Russia has hurried to make a number of acts of obeisance of a public character toward the new Ukrainian leadership” in order to show that “the period of Russian-Ukrainian alienation is in the past,” that these past difficulties were the fault of President Viktor Yushchenko, and that “life is becoming better, life is becoming happier.”
At the same time, she notes, Russian commentators have hurried to specify “what kind of a Ukraine Russia needs,” arguing that Moscow needs a Ukraine which is “predictable” both at home and abroad, “semi-authoritarian” for whom “’stability’ is a euphemism for reform, and which makes Russian the second state language and the Moscow Patriarchate the main church.
Moreover, these Russian commentators have said, Russia needs a Ukraine which will not join NATO but will allow Russia’s fleet to remain in Crimea after 2017 and will meet the “business needs” of the Russian political elite, needs, which remain largely “outside of the framework of public discussions.”
And at the most general level, the Glavred commentator says, Russians “consider (or give the impression they do) that for effective cooperation and the conduct of a friendly policy between Russia and Ukraine, the preeminent factor is the level of loyalty of the Ukrainian president to Moscow.”
But in all these discussion, Yakhno continues, one question is missing: “what kind of Russia does Ukraine need?” And behind that question, for which Russian commentators have failed to provide any answer, is “another question,” one that if anything is more fateful: “What kind of Russia does Russia itself need?”
It is clear, the Glavred writer says, that “the format of bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relations depends more on Russia than it does on Ukraine,” something that is not a source for optimism because “even with friendly countries” like Belarus and Kazakhstan, Russia has difficulties maintaining close ties.
The situation with Ukraine in this regard is especially important, she says. While relations between Russia and Ukraine under Yushchenko were not especially good, “however paradoxical it may sound, his presidency despite all the anti-Yushchenko rhetoric of Russian politicians, had its benefits for the ruling Russian tandem.”
Ukraine, second only to Georgia, played the chief “anti-hero in the Russian public space.” And the existence of that image obviated the need for “real policy” and even “allowed the Russian powers that be to hide Russia’s lack of a serious strategy relative to the CIS countries in general and Ukraine in particular.”
In fact, Yakhno continues, it allowed Moscow the chance to “project Russia on a blank screen as a giant of geopolitics.”
There is no doubt that relations between Moscow and Kyiv will improve now that Yanukovich is president. But “in order that cooperation bear a real and not exclusively declarative character, it is obvious that there will have to developed an integral and internally consistent philosophy of these relations,” a challenge above all for Russia.
That is because, Yakhno suggests, “the position of Ukraine through the period of independence was and is unchanged.” Yanukovich has “reaffirmed that the strategic goal of the foreign policy of Ukraine is European integration, alongside effective cooperation with Russia and the US.”
Given that “multi-vector approach,” she writes, “where Europe is conceived of as a political partner and model of the future, and Russia as above all an economic counter-agent and ‘reliable rear,’ inherited from the past,” Kyiv’s choice will remain with the future, and “therefore, there will not be a cardinal turn of Ukraine toward the Russian Federation.”
And what that means, Yakhno says, is that “the real test for Russian-Ukrainian relations did not end with the departure of Yushchenko but only began with the installation of Yanukovich in office” because Moscow can no longer avoid facing the need to develop a real policy toward Kyiv rather than hide behind denunciations of the Orange Revolution.
Whether Moscow is up to that task is unclear, she writes. Not only does Russia face a broad range of economic and political problems at home, but the regime itself is divided about what it wants and will do next. President Dmitry Medvedev clearly wants to see some kind of modernization, although “today few people in modernization Kremlin-style.”
As for Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Yakhno continues, he has talked about three “possible variants of the development of the political system on the post-Soviet space:” Ukrainianization, which Russians understand to mean “political instability and a lack of control,” “harsh authoritarianism” (Turkmenistan), and semi-authoritarian Putinism as in Russia.
Putin clearly wants the third to continue in Russia, “even if this directly contradicts modernization,” as it almost certainly does. That is because, Yakhno insists, “modernization is possible only under conditions of ‘Ukrainianization’ or ‘authoritarianism,” the one allowing messy competition and the other marching forward under tight control.
The tension between the requirements of modernization and the needs of the members of the current set of powers that be in Moscow to remain in office, the Ukrainian analyst continues, are creating conditions for the rise of “subjectivism in politics,” a term taken from the Khrushchev period.
It refers, Yakhno says, to an approach which rejects “institutional forms of control” and thus opens the way for actions “which do not take into account the objective patterns of history and the real circumstances of the contemporary development of the country.” In short, it leads to decisions “based on faith in the all powerful nature of administrative and force decisions.”
Such an approach, now very much in evidence in Moscow, does not create the kind of Russia that Ukraine needs, Yakhno says. She then gives a list of six qualities that she argues Russia needs to develop if it is to have good relations with its neighbors and to develop and modernize at home.
First, she writes, Ukraine needs a Russia “which clearly understands its place in the contemporary world: a major, economically powerful and rich country with enormous natural resources and human potential but not a global or even a regional power.”
Second, Ukraine needs a Russia which “is not an empire but a contemporary nation state.” Third, it needs a Russia which “at least approximately believes in what it officially proclaims.” Fourth, it needs a Russia “which thinks in the categories of politics and not business camouflaged as politics.
Fifth, it needs a Russia which “decides above all its state tasks and not the tasks of big business.” And sixth, it needs a Russia “which can once and for all formulate an exhaustive list of its expectations from Ukraine,” thus allowing Kyiv to respond positively to those it agrees with and negatively to those it does not.
In sum, Yakhno says, “Ukraine needs a Russia will simply be another country, important and strong to be sure, but one of the other countries and not the boss, not the elder brother, and what is the most important thing, not an eternal factor in Ukrainian domestic politics.”
That will benefit both countries because “when the policy of Ukraine in the Russian direction finally becomes a foreign and not a domestic manner, then will take place the psychological liberation of Ukraine and its elite from Russia, and Ukraine finally will acquire its independence.”


quarta-feira, março 24, 2010

Expectativas moscovitas para a Ucrânia são irrealistas

Os comentários russos sobre as consequências da eleição de Viktor Yanukovich como presidente da Ucrânia mostraram o aumento das expectativas irrealisticamente elevados em Moscovo, a tal ponto que alguns ou todos serão certamente frustradas nos próximos meses, de acordo com o especialista em segurança nacional, próximo de Kremlin.

Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Expectations for Ukraine Excessive, Likely to Be Dashed, Kremlin Expert Says

by: Paul Goble

Vienna, March 23 – Russian commentaries on the consequences of Viktor Yanukovich’s election as president of Ukraine have raised expectations in Moscow to such an unrealistically high point that some or all of them almost certainly are going to be dashed in the months ahead, according to a Kremlin expert on national security.
In a comment posted online this week, Aleksandr Mikhaylenko, a professor of national security at the Russian Academy of Government Service in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, says “the idealization of the post-election situation in Ukraine” is not in Russia’s interest (
Since the Ukrainian presidential elections, the national security specialist says, the Russian media have been filled with materials which “excessively idealize the situation in Ukraine,” thus creating among Russians and the Russian political class “heightened expectations” about where Kyiv will go with respect to Moscow.
But, he continues, “an analysis shows that the elections just past were yet another testimonial of the fact that [Ukraine] remains split in half.” That provides the explanation for the “transparency and democracy” of the elections: “the forces of the competing sides [were and remain] approximately equal.”
Indeed, Mikhaylenko continues, Yanukovich won “to a significant degree” thanks to the actions of his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko, who behaved in such a way that he guaranteed he would lose. As a result, the Moscow writer say, many in Ukraine and in Russia are ready to award Yushchenko the title of Hero of Russia for opening the way for Yanukovich.
And that even division explains both why there was not an echo of the Orange Revolution this time around and why Yanukovich almost certainly will behave very differently now that he is Ukrainian president than he said he would while he was engaged in a campaign to gain that office.
Yulia Timoshenko, whom Yanukovich defeated, clearly was thinking about a repetition of the earlier events, pointedly declaring after the vote that “Yanukovich is not our president,” but the new incumbent countered by bringing in his supporters in the force structures into the Ukrainian capital in a show of force.
That prevented an Orange Revolution II, Mikhaylenko says, but adds that “it is not difficult [for him] to imagine that the next time [there is a political crisis in Ukraine] the opposition will call people to come out into the streets,” something that makes predicting the future of Kyiv’s policies extremely difficult.
And Yanukovich clearly is aware that governing is different than campaigning. By making his first foreign visit to Brussels rather than to Moscow and by declaring that Ukrainian will remain “the single state language,” the new president has shown that he is not going to change direction too far or too quickly lest he exacerbate tensions inside Ukraine.
There has not been and will not be a “180 degree” change of direction under Yanukovich. “No one needs” what that would entail, the Moscow analyst continues, recalling that one of Yushchenko’s first mistake in 2005 was to replace some 18,000 government employees, insisting on loyalty and getting “absolute incompetence.” No one wants a repetition.
For all these reasons, the Moscow advisor concludes, no one in the Russian capital should assume that there now exists, after Yanukovich’s rise to office, “a single scenario for the development of the political situation in Ukraine” and that that scenario points to a complete rapprochement between Kyiv and Moscow.
“Alongside these excessively optimistic prognostications,” Mikhaylenko argues, “one must keep in mind other possible variants as well.” It could be that Ukraine will not turn toward Russia as many in Russia expect, not only because of its internal divisions but because of Russian and Western actions.
And at the very least, the Kremlin advisor says, there is going to be in the Ukrainian capital “a lengthy struggle” among the various contenders none of whom has left the scene. Moscow, Mikhaylenko says, must “construct its policy” toward Kyiv not only reflecting Russia’s interests but also Ukraine’s real situation.


sexta-feira, março 19, 2010

Shevchenko no dia Internacional de poesia

No dia Internacional de poesia, não podia esquecer e não citar o belo poema de Taras_Shevtchenko “É-me indiferente”.

“É-me indiferente”.
Já não me importa... É-me indiferente
Que eu morra na Ucrânia, ou algures,
Que alguém me lembre, ou me olvide
Sozinho entre as neves do exílio,
Ai, não me importa, não me importa!
Cresci no exílio, como escravo,
Pois, exilado morrerei
E tudo levarei comigo.
Não deixo nem um rasto leve
Em nossa Ucrânia tão gloriosa,
Em nossa pátria escravizada.
Não lembrará o pai ao filho,
Não lhe dirá: " Ai, reze, filho,
Pois, pelo amor que teve à Ucrânia,
Outrora, foi sacrificado... "
E não me importa que esse filho
Reze, ou não reze por minh'alma
O que me dói é que homens maus
A Ucrânia embalam com mentiras
E um dia a acorde o incêndio e o roubo.
Ai, isso, sim é que me importa!


Mais poesia ucraniana em português:

A poesia de Taras Shevchenko em inglês:

Livros da editora ucraniana Tempora:

quarta-feira, março 17, 2010

Receita da paz mundial

Uma maneira interessante de alcançar a paz mundial é proposta neste cartoon. Basta medir as pilas dos líderes, sem nenhuma necessidade de fazer as guerras.

Na imagem EUA vs Rússia. Os EUA ganharam! No caso de aplicar este método, a Rússia não precisava de atacar a Geórgia em Agosto de ano passado. Pois os dados anatómicos indicam que Dmitri Medvedev não é nenhuma, por assim dizer, grande espingarda…

sexta-feira, março 05, 2010

Defender Stepan Bandera!

Defender Stepan Bandera!

O Web – recurso, Serviço Informativo Ucraniano, lançou a Petição ao Parlamento Europeu em defesa do Stepan_Bandera, líder da Organização dos Nacionalistas Ucranianos (OUN), assassinado em 1959 na Alemanha Federal pelo agente do KGB.

Open Appeal from Ukrainians to the Members of European Parliament with regards to the defamation of Stepan Bandera in the text of the Resolution of the European Parliament on the Situation in Ukraine from February 25, 2010.

We, Ukrainians, citizens of Ukraine and other countries, express our protest against point #20 of the Resolution on the Situation in Ukraine of February 25, 2010 in which the European Parliament “deeply deplores” the decision by the outgoing President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, to posthumously award Stepan Bandera, leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the tile of “Hero of Ukraine” and recommends that the new president Victor Yanukovych reconsider the decision of his predecessor. Moreover, this official document of the highest legislative body of the European Union implies, without grounds, that Stepan Bandera was a Nazi collaborator during the Second World War.

We believe that the European Parliament’s decision is historically groundless and is based on disinformation about the so-called “collaboration” between the OUN and Third Reich that was spread by Soviet propaganda.

On June 30, 1941, Stepan Bandera and his colleagues announced the renewal of independent Ukrainian statehood in Lviv against the will of Hitler’s Germany. For this they were killed or incarcerated in Nazi concentration camps. Bandera himself was a prisoner of the Sachsenhausen camp. His brothers Oleksandr and Vasyl were killed in the infamous Auschwitz camp. The national liberation movement headed by Bandera fought for the independent statehood of Ukraine against the Bolshevik and Nazi occupants. Neither OUN headed by Bandera nor the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) are mentioned in the verdicts of Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.

The opinion expressed by the European Parliament about Stepan Bandera is an insult to millions of Ukrainians who were killed or otherwise repressed for their commitment to freedom and independence.

We call on you to revisit the content of this tendentious resolution. When the European Parliament issues such statements, the very idea of European integration is discredited among its supporters in Ukraine who, as patriots, consider Stepan Bandera to truly be a national hero.

Assinar a petição:


Comprar a insígnia comemorativa dedicada à memória do Stepan Bandera, preço 35 UAH (3,57 Eur).

Local de compra: Kyiv, rua Yaroslaviv Val, № 9, Serviço Informativo Ucraniano, Tel. +380 44 279 81 33, e-mail: uis-center pesyk ukr krapka net